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Technical University of Munich
Abstract. Simple stochastic games can be solved by value iteration
(VI), which yields a sequence of under-approximations of the value of
the game. This sequence is guaranteed to converge to the value only in
the limit. Since no stopping criterion is known, this technique does not
provide any guarantees on its results. We provide the first stopping cri-
terion for VI on simple stochastic games. It is achieved by additionally
computing a convergent sequence of over-approximations of the value,
relying on an analysis of the game graph. Consequently, VI becomes an
anytime algorithm returning the approximation of the value and the cur-
rent error bound. As another consequence, we can provide a simulation-
based asynchronous VI algorithm, which yields the same guarantees, but
without necessarily exploring the whole game graph.
1 Introduction
Simple stochastic game (SG) [Con92] is a zero-sum two-player game played
on a graph by Maximizer and Minimizer, who choose actions in their respective
vertices (also called states). Each action is associated with a probability distri-
bution determining the next state to move to. The objective of Maximizer is
to maximize the probability of reaching a given target state; the objective of
Minimizer is the opposite.
Stochastic games constitute a fundamental problem for several reasons. From
the theoretical point of view, the complexity of this problem1 is known to be in
UP∩coUP [HK66] , but no polynomial-time algorithm is known. Further, sev-
eral other important problems can be reduced to SG, for instance parity games,
mean-payoff games, discounted-payoff games and their stochastic extensions can
all be reduced to SG [CF11]. The task of solving SG is also polynomial-time
equivalent to solving perfect information Shapley, Everett and Gillette games
[AM09]. Besides, the problem is practically relevant in verification and synthe-
sis. SG can model reactive systems, with players corresponding to the controller
of the system and to its environment, where quantified uncertainty is explicitly
modelled. This is useful in many application domains, ranging from smart en-
ergy management [CFK+13c] to autonomous urban driving [CKSW13], robot
⋆ This research was funded in part by the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes project
“Formal methods for analysis of attack-defence diagrams”, the Czech Science Foun-
dation grant No. 18-11193S, and the German Research Foundation (DFG) project
KR 4890/2-1 “Statistical Unbounded Verification”.
1 Formally, the problem is to decide, for a given p ∈ [0, 1] whether Maximizer has a
strategy ensuring probability at least p to reach the target.
motion planning [LaV00] to self-adaptive systems [CMG14]; for various recent
case studies, see e.g. [SK16]. Finally, since Markov decision processes (MDP)
[Put14] are a special case with only one player, SG can serve as abstractions of
large MDP [KKNP10].
Solution techniques There are several classes of algorithms for solving SG,
most importantly strategy iteration (SI) algorithms [HK66] and value iteration
(VI) algorithms [Con92]. Since the repetitive evaluation of strategies in SI is
often slow in practice, VI is usually preferred, similarly to the special case of
MDPs [KM17]. For instance, the most used probabilistic model checker PRISM
[KNP11] and its branch PRISM-Games [CFK+13a] use VI for MDP and SG
as the default option, respectively. However, while SI is in principle a precise
method, VI is an approximative method, which converges only in the limit. Un-
fortunately, there is no known stopping criterion for VI applied to SG. Conse-
quently, there are no guarantees on the results returned in finite time. Therefore,
current tools stop when the difference between the two most recent approxima-
tions is low, and thus may return arbitrarily imprecise results [HM17].
Value iteration with guarantees In the special case of MDP, in order to
obtain bounds on the imprecision of the result, one can employ a bounded variant
of VI [MLG05,BCC+14] (also called interval iteration [HM17]). Here one com-
putes not only an under-approximation, but also an over-approximation of the
actual value as follows. On the one hand, iterative computation of the least fix-
point of Bellman equations yields an under-approximating sequence converging
to the value. On the other hand, iterative computation of the greatest fixpoint
yields an over-approximation, which, however, does not converge to the value.
Moreover, it often results in the trivial bound of 1. A solution suggested for
MDPs [BCC+14,HM17] is to modify the underlying graph, namely to collapse
end components. In the resulting MDP there is only one fixpoint, thus the least
and greatest fixpoint coincide and both approximating sequences converge to
the actual value. In contrast, for general SG no procedure where the greatest
fixpoint converges to the value is known. In this paper we provide one, yielding
a stopping criterion. We show that the pre-processing approach of collapsing is
not applicable in general and provide a solution on the original graph. We also
characterize SG where the fixpoints coincide and no processing is needed. The
main technical challenge is that states in an end component in SG can have
different values, in contrast to the case of MDP.
Practical efficiency using guarantees We further utilize the obtained guar-
antees to practically improve our algorithm. Similar to the MDP case [BCC+14],
the quantification of the error allows for ignoring parts of the state space, and
thus a speed up without jeopardizing the correctness of the result. Indeed, we
provide a technique where some states are not explored and processed at all, but
their potential effect is still taken into account in the lower and upper bound on
the result. The information is further used to decide the states to be explored
next and the states to be analyzed in more detail. To this end, simulations and
learning are used as tools. While for MDP this idea has already demonstrated
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speed ups in orders of magnitude [BCC+14,ACD+17], this paper provides the
first technique of this kind for SG.
Our contribution is summarized as follows:
– We introduce a VI algorithm yielding both under- and over-approximation
sequences, both of which converge to the value of the game. Thus we present
the first stopping criterion for VI on SG and the first anytime algorithm
with guaranteed precision. We also characterize when a simpler solution is
sufficient.
– We provide a learning-based algorithm, which preserves the guarantees, but
is in some cases more efficient since it avoids exploring the whole state space.
– We evaluate the running times of the algorithms experimentally, concluding
that obtaining guarantees requires an overhead that is either negligible or
mitigated by the learning-based approach.
Related work The works closest to ours are the following. As mentioned
above, [BCC+14,HM17] describe the solution to the special case of MDP. While
[BCC+14] also provides a learning-based algorithm, [HM17] discusses the con-
vergence rate and the exact solution. The basic algorithm of [HM17] is imple-
mented in PRISM [BKL+17] and the learning approach of [BCC+14] in Storm
[DJKV17a]. The extension for SG where the interleaving of players is severely
limited (every end component belongs to one player only) is discussed in [Ujm15].
Further, in the area of probabilistic planning, bounded real-time dynamic
programming [MLG05] is related to our learning-based approach. However, it
is limited to the setting of stopping MDP where the target sink or the non-
target sink is reached almost surely under any pair of strategies and thus the
fixpoints coincide. Our algorithm works for general SG, not only for stopping
ones, without any blowup.
For SG, the tools implementing the standard SI and/or VI algorithms are
PRISM-games [CFK+13a], GAVS+ [CKLB11] and GIST [CHJR10]. The latter
two are, however, neither maintained nor accessible via the links provided in
their publications any more.
Apart from fundamental algorithms to solve SG, there are various practically
efficient heuristics that, however, provide none or weak guarantees, often based
on some form of learning [BT00,LL08,WT16,TT16,AY17,BBS08]. Finally, the
only currently available way to obtain any guarantees through VI is to perform
γ2 iterations and then round to the nearest multiple of 1/γ, yielding the value
of the game with precision 1/γ [CH08]; here γ cannot be freely chosen, but it
is a fixed number, exponential in the number of states and the used probability
denominators. However, since the precision cannot be chosen and the number of
iterations is always exponential, this approach is infeasible even for small games.
Organization of the paper Section 2 introduces the basic notions and revises
value iteration. Section 3 explains the idea of our approach on an example.
Section 4 provides a full technical treatment of the method as well as the learning-
based variation. Section 5 discusses experimental results and Section 6 concludes.
The appendix gives technical details on the pseudocode as well as the conducted
experiments and provides more extensive proofs to the theorems and lemmata;
in the main body, there are only proof sketches and ideas.
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Fig. 1: An example of an SG with S = {p, q, 1, 0}, S

= {q, 1}, S© = {p, 0},
the initial state p and the set of actions A = {a, b, c, d, e}; Av(p) = {a} with
δ(p, a)(q) = 1; Av(q) = {b, c} with δ(q, b)(p) = 1 and δ(q, c)(q) = δ(q, c)(1) =
δ(q, c)(0) = 13 . For actions with only one successor, we do not depict the transi-
tion probability 1.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic definitions
A probability distribution on a finite set X is a mapping δ : X → [0, 1], such
that
∑
x∈X δ(x) = 1. The set of all probability distributions on X is denoted
by D(X). Now we define stochastic games, in literature often referred as simple
stochastic games or stochastic two-player games with a reachability objective.
Definition 1 (SG). A stochastic game (SG) is a tuple (S , S

, S©, s0,A,Av, δ, 1, 0),
where S is a finite set of states partitioned into the sets S

and S© of states of
the player Maximizer and Minimizer, respectively, s0, 1, 0 ∈ S is the initial state,
target state, and sink state, respectively, A is a finite set of actions, Av : S → 2A
assigns to every state a set of available actions, and δ : S ×A → D(S ) is a tran-
sition function that given a state s and an action a ∈ Av(s) yields a probability
distribution over successor states.
A Markov decision process (MDP) is a special case of SG where S© = ∅.
We assume that SGs are non-blocking, so for all states s we have Av(s) 6= ∅.
Further, 1 and 0 only have one action and it is a self-loop with probability 1.
Additionally, we can assume that the SG is preprocessed so that all states with
no path to 1 are merged with 0.
For a state s and an available action a ∈ Av(s), we denote the set of successors
by Post(s, a) := {s′ | δ(s, a, s′) > 0}. Finally, for any set of states T ⊆ S , we use
T and T© to denote the states in T that belong to Maximizer and Minimizer,
whose states are drawn in the figures as  and ©, respectively. An example of
an SG is given in Figure 1.
The semantics of SG is given in the usual way by means of strategies and the
induced Markov chain and the respective probability space, as follows. An infi-
nite path ρ is an infinite sequence ρ = s0a0s1a1 . . . ∈ (S×A)
ω, such that for every
i ∈ N, ai ∈ Av(si) and si+1 ∈ Post(si, ai). Finite paths are defined analogously as
elements of (S ×A)∗× S . Since this paper deals with the reachability objective,
we can restrict our attention to memoryless strategies, which are optimal for this
objective. We still allow randomizing strategies, because they are needed for the
learning-based algorithm later on. A strategy of Maximizer or Minimizer is a
function σ : S

→ D(A) or S© → D(A), respectively, such that σ(s) ∈ D(Av(s))
for all s. We call a strategy deterministic if it maps to Dirac distributions only.
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Note that there are finitely many deterministic strategies. A pair (σ, τ) of strate-
gies of Maximizer and Minimizer induces a Markov chain Gσ,τ where the transi-
tion probabilities are defined as δ(s, s′) =
∑
a∈Av(s) σ(s, a) ·δ(s, a, s
′) for states of
Maximizer and analogously for states of Minimizer, with σ replaced by τ . The
Markov chain induces a unique probability distribution Pσ,τs over measurable
sets of infinite paths [BK08, Ch. 10].
We write ♦1 := {ρ | ∃i ∈ N. ρ(i) = 1} to denote the (measurable) set of all
paths which eventually reach 1. For each s ∈ S , we define the value in s as
V(s) := sup
σ
inf
τ
Pσ,τs (♦1) = inf
τ
sup
σ
Pσ,τs (♦1),
where the equality follows from [Mar75]. We are interested not only in V(s0),
but also its ε-approximations and the corresponding (ε-)optimal strategies for
both players.
Now we recall a fundamental tool for analysis of MDP called end components.
We introduce the following notation. Given a set of states T ⊆ S , a state s ∈ T
and an action a ∈ Av(s), we say that (s, a) exitsT if Post(s, a) 6⊆ T . We define
an end component of a SG as the end component of the underlying MDP with
both players unified.
Definition 2 (EC). A non-empty set T ⊆ S of states is an end component
(EC) if there is a non-empty set B ⊆
⋃
s∈T Av(s) of actions such that
1. for each s ∈ T, a ∈ B ∩ Av(s) we do not have (s, a) exitsT ,
2. for each s, s′ ∈ T there is a finite path w = sa0 . . . ans
′ ∈ (T × B)∗ × T , i.e.
the path stays inside T and only uses actions in B.
Intuitively, ECs correspond to bottom strongly connected components of the
Markov chains induced by possible strategies, so for some pair of strategies all
possible paths starting in the EC remain there. An end component T is amaximal
end component (MEC) if there is no other end component T ′ such that T ⊆ T ′.
Given an SG G, the set of its MECs is denoted by MEC(G) and can be computed
in polynomial time [CY95].
2.2 (Bounded) value iteration
The value function V satisfies the following system of equations, which is referred
to as the Bellman equations :
V(s) =


maxa∈Av(s) V(s, a) if s ∈ S
mina∈Av(s) V(s, a) if s ∈ S©
1 if s = 1
0 if s = 0
(1)
where2
V(s, a) :=
∑
s′∈S
δ(s, a, s′) · V(s′) (2)
2 Throughout the paper, for any function f : S → [0, 1] we overload the notation and
also write f(s, a) meaning
∑
s′∈S δ(s, a, s
′) · f(s′).
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Moreover, V is the least solution to the Bellman equations, see e.g. [CH08]. To
compute the value of V for all states in an SG, one can thus utilize the iterative
approximation method value iteration (VI) as follows. We start with a lower
bound function L0 : S → [0, 1] such that L0(1) = 1 and, for all other s ∈ S ,
L0(s) = 0. Then we repetitively apply Bellman updates (3) and (4)
Ln(s, a) :=
∑
s′∈S
δ(s, a, s′) · Ln−1(s
′) (3)
Ln(s) :=
{
maxa∈Av(s) Ln(s, a) if s ∈ S
mina∈Av(s) Ln(s, a) if s ∈ S©
(4)
until convergence. Note that convergence may happen only in the limit even for
such a simple game as in Figure 1. The sequence is monotonic, at all times a
lower bound on V , i.e. Li(s) ≤ V(s) for all s ∈ S , and the least fixpoint satisfies
L∗ := limn→∞ Ln = V.
Unfortunately, there is no known stopping criterion, i.e. no guarantees how
close the current under-approximation is to the value [HM17]. The current tools
stop when the difference between two successive approximations is smaller than
a certain threshold, which can lead to arbitrarily wrong results [HM17].
For the special case of MDP, it has been suggested to also compute the
greatest fixpoint [MLG05] and thus an upper bound as follows. The function
G : S → [0, 1] is initialized for all states s ∈ S as G0(s) = 1 except for G0(0) = 0.
Then we repetitively apply updates (3) and (4), where L is replaced by G. The
resulting sequence Gn is monotonic, provides an upper bound on V and the
greatest fixpoint G∗ := limn Gn is the greatest solution to the Bellman equations
on [0, 1]S.
This approach is called bounded value iteration (BVI) (or bounded real-
time dynamic programming (BRTDP) [MLG05,BCC+14] or interval iteration
[HM17]). If L∗ = G∗ then they are both equal to V and we say that BVI con-
verges. BVI is guaranteed to converge in MDP if the only ECs are those of
1 and 0 [BCC+14]. Otherwise, if there are non-trivial ECs they have to be
“collapsed”3. Computing the greatest fixpoint on the modified MDP results in
another sequence Ui of upper bounds on V, converging to U
∗ := limn Un. Then
BVI converges even for general MDPs, U∗ = V [BCC+14], when transformed
this way. The next section illustrates this difficulty and the solution through
collapsing on an example.
In summary, all versions of BVI discussed so far and later on in the paper
follow the pattern of Algorithm 1. In the naive version, UPDATE just performs
the Bellman update on L and U according to Equations (3) and (4).4 For a
general MDP, U does not converge to V, but to G∗, and thus the termination
criterion may never be met if G∗(s0) − V(s0) > 0. If the ECs are collapsed in
pre-processing then U converges to V.
3 All states of an EC are merged into one, all leaving actions are preserved and all
other actions are discarded. For more detail see Appendix A.1
4 For the straightforward pseudocode, see Algorithm 6 in Appendix A.2.
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For the general case of SG, the collapsing approach fails and this paper pro-
vides another version of BVI where U converges to V, based on a more detailed
structural analysis of the game.
Algorithm 1 Bounded value iteration algorithm
1: procedure BVI(precision ǫ > 0)
2: for s ∈ S do \* Initialization * \
3: L(s) = 0 \* Lower bound * \
4: U(s) = 1 \* Upper bound * \
5: L(1) = 1 \* Value of sinks is determined a priori * \
6: U(0) = 0
7: repeat
8: UPDATE(L,U) \* Bellman updates or their modification * \
9: until U(s0)− L(s0) < ǫ \* Guaranteed error bound * \
3 Example
In this section, we illustrate the issues preventing BVI convergence and our
solution on a few examples. Recall that G is the sequence converging to the
greatest solution of the Bellman equations, while U is in general any sequence
over-approximating V that one or another BVI algorithm suggests.
Firstly, we illustrate the issue that arises already for the special case of MDP.
Consider the MPD of Figure 2 on the left. Although V(s) = V(t) = 0.5, we have
Gi(s) = Gi(t) = 1 for all i. Indeed, the upper bound for t is always updated
as the maximum of Gi(t, c) and Gi(t, b). Although Gi(t, c) decreases over time,
Gi(t, b) remains the same, namely equal to Gi(s), which in turn remains equal to
Gi(s, a) = Gi(t). This cyclic dependency lets both s and t remain in an “illusion”
that the value of the other one is 1.
The solution for MDP is to remove this cyclic dependency by collapsing all
MECs into singletons and removing the resulting purely self-looping actions.
Figure 2 in the middle shows the MDP after collapsing the EC {s, t}. This turns
the MDP into a stopping one, where 1 or 0 is under any strategy reached with
probability 1. In such MDP, there is a unique solution to the Bellman equations.
Therefore, the greatest fixpoint is equal to the least one and thus to V.
Secondly, we illustrate the issues that additionally arise for general SG. It
turns out that the collapsing approach can be extended only to games where
all states of each EC belong to one player only [Ujm15]. In this case, both
Maximizer’s and Minimizer’s ECs are collapsed the same way as in MDP.
However, when both players are present in an EC, then collapsing may not
solve the issue. Consider the SG of Figure 3. Here α and β represent the values
of the respective actions.5 There are three cases:
5 Precisely, we consider them to stand for a probabilistic branching with probability
α (or β) to 1 and with the remaining probability to 0. To avoid clutter in the figure,
we omit this branching and depict only the value.
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⊥
a
b
c
1
3
1
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{s, t}
1
⊥
c
1
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1
3
1
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e
d
i Li({s, t}) Gi({s, t})
0 0 1
1 13
2
3
2 49
5
9
3 1327
14
27
Fig. 2: Left: An MDP (as special case of SG) where BVI does not converge due to
the grayed EC. Middle: The same MDP where the EC is collapsed, making BVI
converge. Right: The approximations illustrating the convergence of the MDP
in the middle.
First, let α < β. If the bounds converge to these values we eventually observe
Gi(q, e) < Li(r, f) and learn the induced inequality. Since p is a Minimizer’s state
it will never pick the action leading to the greater value of β. Therefore, we can
safely merge p and q, and remove the action leading to r, as shown in the second
subfigure.
Second, if α > β, p and r can be merged in an analogous way, as shown in
the third subfigure.
Third, if α = β, both previous solutions as well as collapsing all three states
as in the fourth subfigure is possible. However, since the approximants may only
converge to α and β in the limit, we may not know in finite time which of these
cases applies and thus cannot decide for any of the collapses.
p
q
r
α
β
a
b
c
d
e
f
pq
r
α
β
d
e
f
pr
q α
β
b
e
f
pqr
α
β
e
f
Fig. 3: Left: Collapsing ECs in SG may lead to incorrect results. The Greek
letters on the leaving arrows denote the values of the exiting actions. Right
three figures: Correct collapsing in different cases, depending on the relationship
of α and β. In contrast to MDP, some actions of the EC exiting the collapsed
part have to be removed.
Consequently, the approach of collapsing is not applicable in general. In or-
der to ensure BVI convergence, we suggest a different method, which we call
deflating. It does not involve changing the state space, but rather decreasing
the upper bound Ui to the least value that is currently provable (and thus still
correct). To this end, we analyze the exiting actions, i.e. with successors outside
of the EC, for the following reason. If the play stays in the EC forever, the target
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is never reached and Minimizer wins. Therefore, Maximizer needs to pick some
exiting action to avoid staying in the EC.
For the EC with the states s and t in Figure 2, the only exiting action is c.
In this example, since c is the only exiting action, Ui(t, c) is the highest possible
upper bound that the EC can achieve. Thus, by decreasing the upper bound of
all states in the EC to that number6, we still have a safe upper bound. Moreover,
with this modification BVI converges in this example, intuitively because now
the upper bound of t depends on action c as it should.
For the example in Figure 3, it is correct to decrease the upper bound to
the maximal exiting one, i.e. max{αˆ, βˆ}, where αˆ := Ui(a), βˆ := Ui(b) are the
current approximations of α and of β. However, this itself does not ensure BVI
convergence. Indeed, if for instance αˆ < βˆ then deflating all states to βˆ is not
tight enough, as values of p and q can even be bounded by αˆ. In fact, we have
to find a certain sub-EC that corresponds to αˆ, in this case {p, q} and set all its
upper bounds to αˆ. We define and compute these sub-ECs in the next section.
In summary, the general structure of our convergent BVI algorithm is to
produce the sequence U by application of Bellman updates and occasionally find
the relevant sub-ECs and deflate them. The main technical challenge is that
states in an EC in SG can have different values, in contrast to the case of MDP.
4 Convergent Over-approximation
In Section 4.1, we characterize SGs where Bellman equations have more solu-
tions. Based on the analysis, subsequent sections show how to alter the procedure
computing the sequence Gi over-approximating V so that the resulting tighter
sequence Ui still over-approximates V, but also converges to V. This ensures that
thus modified BVI converges. Section 4.4 presents the learning-based variant of
our BVI.
4.1 Bloated end components cause non-convergence
As we have seen in the example of Fig. 3, BVI generally does not converge due to
ECs with a particular structure of the exiting actions. The analysis of ECs relies
on the extremal values that can be achieved by exiting actions (in the example,
α and β). Given the value function V or just its current over-approximation Ui,
we define the most profitable exiting action for Maximizer (denoted by ) and
Minimizer (denoted by ©) as follows.
Definition 3 (bestExit). Given a set of states T ⊆ S and a function f : S →
[0, 1] (see footnote 2), the f -value of the best T -exiting action of Maximizer and
Minimizer, respectively, is defined as
bestExitf (T ) = max
s∈T
(s,a) exitsT
f(s, a)
bestExit
©
f (T ) = min
s∈T©
(s,a) exitsT
f(s, a)
with the convention that max∅ = 0 and min∅ = 1.
6 We choose the name “deflating” to evoke decreasing the overly high “pressure” in
the EC until it equalizes with the actual “pressure” outside.
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Example 1. In the example of Fig. 3 on the left with T = {p, q, r} and α < β,
we have bestExitV (T ) = β, bestExit
©
V
(T ) = 1. It is due to β < 1 that BVI does
not converge here. We generalize this in the following lemma. △
Lemma 1. Let T be an EC. For every m satisfying bestExitV (T ) ≤ m ≤
bestExit
©
V
(T ), there is a solution f : S → [0, 1] to the Bellman equations, which
on T is constant and equal to m.
Proof (Idea). Intuitively, such a constant m is a solution to the Bellman equa-
tions on T for the following reasons. As both players prefer getting m to exiting
and getting “only” the values of their respective bestExit, they both choose to
stay in the EC (and the extrema in the Bellman equations are realized on non-
exiting actions). On the one hand, Maximizer (Bellman equations with max)
is hoping for the promised m, which is however not backed up by any actions
actually exiting towards the target. On the other hand, Minimizer (Bellman
equations with min) does not realize that staying forever results in her optimal
value 0 instead of m. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. If bestExit©
V
(T ) > bestExitV (T ) for some EC T , then G
∗ 6= V.
Proof. Since there arem1,m2 such that bestExit

V (T ) < m1 < m2 < bestExit
©
V
(T ),
by Lemma 1 there are two different solutions to the Bellman equations. In par-
ticular, G∗ > L∗ = V, and BVI does not converge. ⊓⊔
In accordance with our intuition that ECs satisfying the above inequality
should be deflated, we call them bloated.
Definition 4 (BEC). An EC T is called a bloated end component (BEC), if
bestExit
©
V
(T ) > bestExitV (T ).
Example 2. In the example of Fig. 3 on the left with α < β, the ECs {p, q} and
{p, q, r} are BECs. △
Example 3. If an EC T has no exiting actions of Minimizer (or no Minimizer’s
states at all, as in an MDP), then bestExit©
V
(T ) = 1 (the case with min∅). Hence
all numbers between bestExitV (T ) and 1 are a solution to the Bellman equations
and G∗(s) = 1 for all states s ∈ T .
Analogously, if Maximizer does not have any exiting action in T , then
bestExitV (T ) = 0 (the case with max∅), it is a BEC and all numbers between 0
and bestExit©
V
(T ) are a solution to the Bellman equations.
Note that in MDP all ECs belong to one player, namely Maximizer. Conse-
quently, all ECs are BECs except for ECs where Maximizer has an exiting action
with value 1; all other ECs thus have to be collapsed (or deflated) to ensure BVI
convergence in MDPs. Interestingly, all non-trivial ECs in MDPs are a problem,
while in SGs through the presence of the other player some ECs can converge,
namely if both players want to exit. Such an EC is depicted in Appendix A.3 △
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We show that BECs are indeed the only obstacle for BVI convergence.
Theorem 1. If the SG contains no BECs except for {0} and {1}, then G∗ = V.
Proof (Sketch). Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is some state s
with a positive difference G∗(s) − V(s) > 0. Consider the set D of states with
the maximal difference. D can be shown to be an EC. Since it is not a BEC
there has to be an action exiting D and realizing the optimum in that state.
Consequently, this action also has the maximal difference, and all its successors,
too. Since some of the successors are outside of D, we get a contradiction with
the maximality of D. ⊓⊔
In Section 4.2, we show how to eliminate BECs by collapsing their “core”
parts, called below MSECs (maximal simple end components). Since MSECs can
only be identified with enough information about V, Section 4.3 shows how to
avoid direct a priori collapsing and instead dynamically deflate candidates for
MSECs in a conservative way.
4.2 Static MSEC decomposition
Now we turn our attention to SG with BECs. Intuitively, since in a BEC all Min-
imizer’s exiting actions have a higher value than what Maximizer can achieve,
Minimizer does not want to use any of his own exiting actions and prefers stay-
ing in the EC (or steering Maximizer towards his worse exiting actions). Con-
sequently, only Maximizer wants to take an exiting action. In the MDP case he
can pick any desirable one. Indeed, he can wait until he reaches a state where
it is available. As a result, in MDP all states of an EC have the same value
and can all be collapsed into one state. In the SG case, he may be restricted
by Minimizer’s behaviour or even not given any chance to exit the EC at all.
As a result, a BEC may contain several parts (below denoted MSECs), each
with different value, intuitively corresponding to different exits. Thus instead of
MECs, we have to decompose into finer MSECs and only collapse these.
Definition 5 (Simple EC). An EC T is called simple (SEC), if for all s ∈ T
we have V(s) = bestExitV (T ).
A SEC C is maximal (MSEC) if there is no SEC C′ such that C ( C′.
Intuitively, an EC is simple, if Minimizer cannot keep Maximizer away from
his bestExit. Independently of Minimizer’s decisions, Maximizer can reach the
bestExit almost surely, unless Minimizer decides to leave, in which case Maxi-
mizer could achieve an even higher value.
Example 4. Assume α < β in the example of Figure 3. Then {p, q} is a SEC
and an MSEC. Further observe that action c is sub-optimal for Minimizer and
removing it does not affect the value of any state, but simplifies the graph struc-
ture. Namely, it destructs the whole EC into several (here only one) SECs and
some non-EC states (here r). △
Algorithm 2, called FIND MSEC, shows how to compute MSECs. It returns
the set of all MSECs if called with parameter V. However, later we also call this
function with other parameters f : S → [0, 1]. The idea of the algorithm is the
following. The set X consists of Minimizer’s sub-optimal actions, leading to a
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higher value. As such they cannot be a part of any SEC and thus should be
ignored when identifying SECs. (The previous example illustrates that ignoring
X is indeed safe as it does not change the value of the game.) We denote the
game G where the available actions Av are changed to the new available actions
Av′ (ignoring the Minimizer’s sub-optimal ones) as G[Av/Av′]. Once removed,
Minimizer has no choices to affect the value and thus each EC is simple.
Algorithm 2 FIND MSEC
1: function FIND MSEC(f : S → [0, 1])
2: X ← {(s, {a ∈ Av(s) | f(s, a) > f(s)}) | s ∈ S©}
3: Av′ ← Av \X \* Minimizer’s f -suboptimal actions removed * \
4: return MEC(G[Av/Av′]) \* MEC(G[Av/Av′]) are MSECs of the original G * \
Lemma 2 (Correctness of Algorithm 2). T ∈ FIND MSEC(V) if and only
if T is a MSEC.
Proof (Sketch). “If”: Since T is an MSEC, all states in T have the value bestExitV (T ),
and hence also all actions that stay inside T have this value. Thus, no action
that stays in T is removed by Line 3 and it is still a MEC in the modified game.
“Only if”: If T ∈ FIND MSEC(V), then T is a MEC of the game where
the suboptimal available actions (those in X) of Minimizer have been removed.
Hence for all s ∈ T : V(s) = bestExitV (T ), because intuitively Minimizer has
no possibility to influence the value any further, since all actions that could do
so were in X and have been removed. Since T is a MEC in the modified game,
it certainly is an EC in the original game. Hence T is a SEC. The inclusion
maximality follows from the fact that we compute MECs in the modified game.
Thus T is an MSEC. ⊓⊔
Remark 1 (Algorithm with an oracle). In Section 3, we have seen that collapsing
MECs does not ensure BVI convergence. Collapsing does not preserve the values,
since in BECs we would be collapsing states with different values. Hence we want
to collapse only MSECs, where the values are the same. If, moreover, we remove
X in such a collapsed SG, then there are no (non-sink) ECs and BVI converges
on this SG to the original value.
The difficulty with this algorithm is that it requires an oracle to compare
values, for instance a sufficiently precise approximation of V. Consequently, we
cannot pre-compute the MSECs, but have to find them while running BVI.
Moreover, since the approximations converge only in the limit we may never be
able to conclude on simplicity of some ECs. For instance, if α = β in Figure 3,
and if the approximations converge at different speeds, then Algorithm 2 always
outputs only a part of the EC, although the whole EC on {p, q, r} is simple.
In MDPs, all ECs are simple, because there is no second player to be resolved
and all states in an EC have the same value. Thus for MDPs it suffices to collapse
all MECs, in contrast to SG.
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4.3 Dynamic MSEC decomposition
Since MSECs cannot be identified from approximants of V for sure, we refrain
from collapsing7 and instead only decrease the over-approximation in the corre-
sponding way. We call the method deflating, by which we mean decreasing the
upper bound of all states in an EC to its bestExitU , see Algorithm 3. The pro-
cedure DEFLATE (called on the current upper bound Ui) decreases this upper
bound to the minimum possible value according to the current approximation
and thus prevents states from only depending on each other, as in SECs. Intu-
itively, it gradually approximates SECs and performs the corresponding adjust-
ments, but does not commit to any of the approximations.
Algorithm 3 DEFLATE
1: function DEFLATE(EC T , f : S → [0, 1])
2: for s ∈ T do
3: f(s)← min(f(s), bestExitf (T )) \* Decrease the upper bound * \
4: return f
Lemma 3 (DEFLATE is sound). For any f : S → [0, 1] such that f ≥ V and
any EC T , DEFLATE(T, f) ≥ V.
This allows us to define our BVI algorithm as the naive BVI with only the
additional lines 3-4, see Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 UPDATE procedure for bounded value iteration on SG
1: procedure UPDATE(L : S → [0, 1], U : S → [0, 1])
2: L,U get updated according to Eq. (3) and (4) \* Bellman updates * \
3: for T ∈ FIND MSEC(L) do \* Use lower bound to find ECs * \
4: U ← DEFLATE(T,U) \* and deflate the upper bound there * \
Theorem 2 (Soundness and completeness). Algorithm 1 (calling Algorithm 4)
produces monotonic sequences L under- and U over-approximating V, and ter-
minates.
Proof (Sketch). The crux is to show that U converges to V. We assume towards
a contradiction, that there exists a state s with limn→∞ Un(s)−V(s) > 0. Then
there exists a nonempty set of states X where the difference between limn→∞ Un
and V is maximal. If the upper bound of states in X depends on states outside of
X , this yields a contradiction, because then the difference between upper bound
and value would decrease in the next Bellman update. SoX must be an EC where
all states depend on each other. However, if that is the case, calling DEFLATE
decreases the upper bound to something depending on the states outside of X ,
thus also yielding a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Summary of our approach:
1. We cannot collapse MECs, because we cannot collapse BECs with non-
constant values.
2. If we removeX (the sub-optimal actions of Minimizer) we can collapse MECs
(now actually MSECs with constant values).
3. Since we know neitherX nor SECs we gradually deflate SEC approximations.
7 Our subsequent method can be combined with local collapsing whenever the lower
and upper bounds on V are conclusive.
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4.4 Learning-based algorithm
Asynchronous value iteration selects in each round a subset T ⊆ S of states
and performs the Bellman update in that round only on T . Consequently, it
may speed up computation if “important” states are selected. However, using
the standard VI it is even more difficult to determine the current error bound.
Moreover, if some states are not selected infinitely often the lower bound may
not even converge.
In the setting of bounded value iteration, the current error bound is known
for each state and thus convergence can easily be enforced. This gave rise to
asynchronous VI, such as BRTDP (bounded real time dynamic programing) in
the setting of stopping MDPs [MLG05], where the states are selected as those
that appear on a simulation run. Very similar is the adaptation for general MDP
[BCC+14]. In order to simulate a run, the transition probabilities determine how
to resolve the probabilistic choice. In order to resolve the non-deterministic choice
of Maximizer, the “most promising action” is taken, i.e., with the highest U. This
choice is derived from a reinforcement algorithm called delayed Q-learning and
ensures convergence while practically performing well [BCC+14].
In this section, we harvest our convergence results and BVI algorithm for SG,
which allow us to trivially extend the asynchronous learning-based approach of
BRTDP to SGs. On the one hand, the only difference to the MDP algorithm
is how to resolve the choice for Minimizer. Since the situation is dual, we again
pick the “most promising action”, in this case with the lowest L. On the other
hand, the only difference to Algorithm 1 calling Algorithm 4 is that the Bellman
updates of U and L are performed on the states of the simulation run only, see
lines 2-3 of Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Update procedure for the learning/BRTDP version of BVI on SG
1: procedure UPDATE(L : S → [0, 1], U : S → [0, 1])
2: ρ ← path s0, s1, . . . , sℓ of length ℓ ≤ k, obtained by simulation where the
successor of s is s′ with probability δ(s, a, s′) and a is sampled randomly from
argmaxa U(s, a) and argmina L(s, a) for s ∈ S and s ∈ S©, respectively
3: L,U get updated by Eq. (3) and (4) on states sℓ, sℓ−1, . . . , s0 \* all s ∈ ρ * \
4: for T ∈ FIND MSEC(L) do
5: DEFLATE(T,U)
If 1 or 0 is reached in a simulation, we can terminate it. It can happen
that the simulation cycles in an EC. To that end, we have a bound k on the
maximum number of steps. The choice of k is discussed in detail in [BCC+14]
and we use 2·|S | to guarantee the possibility of reaching sinks as well as exploring
new states. If the simulation cycles in an EC, the subsequent call of DEFLATE
ensures that next time there is a positive probability to exit this EC. Further
details can be found in Appendix A.4.
5 Experimental results
We implemented both our algorithms as an extension of PRISM-games [CFK+13a],
a branch of PRISM [KNP11] that allows for modelling SGs, utilizing previous
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work of [BCC+14,Ujm15] for MDP and SG with single-player ECs. We tested the
implementation on the SGs from the PRISM-games case studies [gam] that have
reachability properties and one additional model from [CKJ12] that was also
used in [Ujm15]. We compared the results with both the explicit and the hybrid
engine of PRISM-games, but since the models are small both of them performed
similar and we only display the results of the hybrid engine in Table 1.
Furthermore we ran experiments on MDPs from the PRISM benchmark
suite [KNP12]. We compared our results there to the hybrid and explicit engine
of PRISM, the interval iteration implemented in PRISM [HM17], the hybrid
engine of Storm [DJKV17b] and the BRTDP implementation of [BCC+14].
Recall that the aim of the paper is not to provide a faster VI algorithm, but
rather the first guaranteed one. Consequently, the aim of the experiments is not
to show any speed ups, but to experimentally estimate the overhead needed for
computing the guarantees.
The appendix contains information on the technical details of the experi-
ments (B.1), all the models (B.2) and the tables for the experiments on MDPs
(B.4). Note that although some of the SG models are parametrized they could
only be scaled by manually changing the model file, which complicates extensive
benchmarking.
Although our approaches compute the additional upper bound to give the
convergence guarantees, for each of the experiments one of our algorithms per-
formed similar to PRISM-games. Table 1 shows this result for three of the
four SG models in the benchmarking set. On the fourth model, PRISM’s pre-
computations already solve the problem and hence it cannot be used to compare
the approaches. For completeness, the results are displayed in Appendix B.5.
Whenever there are few MSECs, as in mdsm and cdmsn, BVI performs like
PRISM-games, because only little time is used for deflating. Apparently the ad-
ditional upper bound computation takes very little time in comparison to the
other tasks (e.g. parsing, generating the model, pre-computation) and does not
slow down the verification significantly. For cloud, BVI is slower than PRISM-
games, because there are thousands of MSECs and deflating them takes over
80% of the time. This comes from the fact that we need to compute the ex-
pensive end component decomposition for each deflating step. BRTDP performs
well for cloud, because in this model, as well as generally often if there are many
MECs [BCC+14], only a small part of the state space is relevant for convergence.
For the other models, BRTDP is slower than the deterministic approaches, be-
cause the models are so small that it is faster to first construct them completely
than to explore them by simulation.
Our more extensive experiments on MDPs compare the guaranteed approaches
based on collapsing (learning-based from [BCC+14] and deterministic from [HM17])
to our guaranteed approaches based on deflating (so BRTDP and BVI). Since
both learning-based approaches as well as both deterministic approaches per-
form similarly (see Table 2 in Appendix B.4), we conclude that collapsing and
deflating are both useful for practical purposes, while the latter is also applica-
ble to SGs. Furthermore we compared the usual unguaranteed value iteration of
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Table 1: Experimental results for the experiments on SGs. The left two columns
denote the model and the given parameters, if present. Columns 3 to 5 display
the verification time in seconds for each of the solvers, namely PRISM-games
(referred as PRISM), our BVI algorithm (BVI) and our learning-based algorithm
(BRTDP). The next two columns compare the number of states that BRTDP
explored (#States B) to the total number of states in the model. The rightmost
column shows the number of MSECs in the model.
Model Parameters PRISM BVI BRTDP #States B #States #MSECs
mdsm
prop=1 8 8 17 767 62,245 1
prop=2 4 4 29 407 62,245 1
cdmsn 2 2 3 1,212 1,240 1
cloud
N=5 3 7 15 1,302 8,842 4,421
N=6 6 59 4 570 34,954 17,477
PRISM’s explicit engine to BVI and saw that our guaranteed approach did not
take significantly more time in most cases. This strengthens the point that the
overhead for the computation of the guarantees is negligible
6 Conclusions
We have provided the first stopping criterion for value iteration on simple stochas-
tic games and an anytime algorithmwith bounds on the current error (guarantees
on the precision of the result). The main technical challenge was that states in
end components in SG can have different values, in contrast to the case of MDP.
We have shown that collapsing is in general not possible, but we utilized the
analysis to obtain the procedure of deflating, a solution on the original graph.
Besides, whenever a SEC is identified for sure it can be collapsed and the two
techniques of collapsing and deflating can thus be combined.
The experiments indicate that the price to pay for the overhead to compute
the error bound is often negligible. For each of the available models, at least one
of our two implementations has performed similar to or better than the standard
approach that yields no guarantees. Further, the obtained guarantees open the
door to (e.g. learning-based) heuristics which treat only a part of the state space
and can thus potentially lead to huge improvements. Surprisingly, already our
straightforward adaptation of such an algorithm for MDP to SG yields inter-
esting results, palliating the overhead of our non-learning method, despite the
most naive implementation of deflating. Future work could reveal whether other
heuristics or more efficient implementation can lead to huge savings as in the
case of MDP [BCC+14].
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Appendix
A Technical information and pseudocode
A.1 Definition of COLLAPSE
COLLAPSE is not only able to collapse ECs in MDPs, but also SECs in SGs. Note
that every EC in an MDP is a SEC. If there are no actions of Maximizer leaving
the SEC, since the game is non-blocking, we have to keep staying actions, so the
SEC becomes a sink. Otherwise all staying actions are removed and the SEC
becomes a single state with all leaving actions of states in the SEC available.
Definition 6 (COLLAPSE). Let G = (S , S

, S©, s0,A,Av, δ, 1, 0) be an SG and
T a SEC in G. Then COLLAPSE(G, T ) = G′ = (S ′, S ′

, S ′©, s
′
0,A
′,Av′, δ′, 1, 0),
where G′ is defined as follows:
– S ′ = (S \ T ) ∪ {sT}
– S ′

= (S

\ T ) ∪ {sT }
– S ′© = (S© \ T )
– s′0 =
{
sT if (s0 ∈ T )
s0 else
– A′ = A
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– Av′(s) is defined for all s ∈ S ′ by:
• Av(s),
if s ∈ (S \ T ), i.e. s 6= sT
(Rest stays the same)
•
⋃
t∈T {a | a ∈ Av(t) ∧ (t, a) stays inT }
if s = sT ∧
⋃
t∈T
{a | a ∈ Av(t) ∧ (t, a) exitsT } = ∅
(Keep staying actions, if there is no exit for Maximizer)
•
⋃
t∈X
{a | a ∈ Av(t) ∧ (t, a) exitsX},
if s = sT
(Keep leaving actions, if there is an exit for Maximizer)
– δ′ is defined for all s ∈ S ′ and a ∈ Av′(s) by:
• δ′(s, a)(s′) = δ(s, a)(s′)
for all s′ ∈ S ′ with s, s′ 6= sT
(Rest stays the same)
• δ′(s, a)(sT ) =
∑
s′∈X δ(s, a)(s
′),
if s 6= sT
(going to X)
• δ′(sT , a)(s
′) = δ(s, a)(s′)
for all s′ ∈ S ′ \ {sT }
(leaving from X)
• δ′(sT , a)(sT ) =
∑
t∈T δ(s, a)(t)
for all s ∈ T such that a ∈ Av(s)
(staying in T )
A.2 Pseudocode for Bellman update
This is the pseudocode for the usual update procedure used for value iteration.
It amounts to performing Bellman updates, i.e. applying Equations 3 and 4 to
the functions U and L once.
Algorithm 6 UPDATE procedure for (naive) value iteration on SG
1: procedure UPDATE(L : S → [0, 1], U : S → [0, 1])
2: for s ∈ S do
3: L(s)← maxa∈Av(s)
∑
s′∈S δ(s, a, s
′) · L(s′)
4: U(s)← maxa∈Av(s)
∑
s′∈S δ(s, a, s
′) · U(s′)
5: for s ∈ S© do
6: L(s)← mina∈Av(s)
∑
s′∈S δ(s, a, s
′) · L(s′)
7: U(s)← mina∈Av(s)
∑
s′∈S δ(s, a, s
′) · U(s′)
A.3 Example of a converging EC
Figure 4 depicts an EC of an SG where G = V and thus BVI converges for this
EC.
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Fig. 4: An example of an EC where G = V. The numbers on the outgoing edges
represent the values of the successor states. In this EC BVI converges, since it
is no BEC and there is only a single solution for the Bellman equations. Using
the leaving action from A, the maximizing player can achieve a value of 0.8
(with a probability of one half), which is the best possible value. The minimizer
can achieve the least possible value of 0.3 (with probability one half) from B.
If either of the players decided not to leave, his opponent would get infinitely
many chances at leaving, and hence a suboptimal value would be achieved. Thus
both players pick their leaving actions and BVI converges for this EC.
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A.4 Additional information to the BRTDP algorithm
This section provides a more detailed pseudocode and some intuitions for Algo-
rithm 5. It is based on [Ujm15, Algorithm 7].
We introduce the notion of best actions to avoid having a case distinction
over the players.
Definition 7 (best actions). The set of best actions for a state s, given the
the current U and L
bestU,L(s) :=
{
{a ∈ Av(s) | U(s, a) = maxa∈Av(s) U(s, a)} if s ∈ S
{a ∈ Av(s) | L(s, a) = mina∈Av(s) L(s, a)} if s ∈ S©.
,
We also need the notion of a restricted game, because we want to restrict
computation to only the explored state space.
Definition 8 (Restricted game GVis). Let G = (S , S

, S©, s0,A,Av, δ, 1, 0)
be an SG and Vis ⊆ S . Then GVis = (SVis, SVis

, SVis© , s
Vis
0 ,A
Vis,AvVis, δVis, 1, 0), i.e.
the game restricted to Vis, is defined as follows:
– SVis

= Vis ∪ {t | ∃s ∈ Vis, a ∈ Av(s) such that δ(s, a, t) > 0 ∧ t ∈ S}
– SVis© = Vis© ∪ {t | ∃s ∈ Vis, a ∈ Av(s) such that δ(s, a, t) > 0 ∧ t ∈ S©}
– SVis = S

∪ S©
– AVis =
⋃
s∈Vis Av(s) ∪ {⊥}
– AvVis(s) = Av(s) if s ∈ Vis, else AvVis(s) = ⊥
– δVis(s, a) = δ(s, a) if s ∈ Vis, else δ(s,⊥)(s) = 1
The following pseudocode is for the complete BRTDP version of BVI on SGs,
not only the update procedure. This is because we have to initialize the additional
variable Vis to remember the set of visited states. After the initialization, it runs
sample trials until convergence.
Algorithm 7 Complete BRTDP version of BVI on SGs
1: procedure BRTDP(SG G, precision ǫ)
2: \* Initialization * \
3: U(s) = 1 for all s ∈ S
4: L(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S
5: L(1) = 1
6: Vis← ∅ \* Set of states visited so far. * \
7: repeat
8: runSampleTrial(s0,U, L,Vis, ǫ)
9: i← i+ 1
10: until U(s0)− L(s0) < ǫ
A sample trial is divided into three phases: Simulating, updating and deflat-
ing.
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In the simulation phase, starting from the initial state a path through the
game gets sampled, always picking a best action and then sampling a successor of
that action according to the GETSUCC-function. This function is not explicitly
stated here, but different versions are discussed in [BCC+14]. For example, one
can sample the successor according to the probability distribution or one can
pick the successor with the maximal difference between its bounds in order to
get to regions of the state space that have not yet been done. The set of visited
states is saved in Vis, in order to be able to compute the restricted game later
in the deflating phase. To avoid the simulation getting stuck in an EC, there is
the condition in Line 9. For the function SIM TOO LONG several versions are
possible, too. One can break the simulation as soon as one state gets seen the
second time on a path or after a certain number of steps k. k should be larger
than the current explored state space size in order to ensure that new states
can be visited with positive probability. The formulas for k given in [Ujm15]
result in numbers much larger than the current explored state space, so that the
paths get very long and if the simulation is stuck a lot of time is wasted. Our
experiments have shown that the simple formula 2 · |SVis| is very fast.
In the update phase, the bounds for all state-action-pairs on the path get
updated according to the Bellman equations. To write this concisely, we utilize
the notation of best actions.
The deflating phase works exactly as in Algorithms 4 and 5, only that now we
apply FIND MSEC to the restricted game. We have noted this in the pseudocode
by adding the parameter GVis, thereby specifying the implicit parameter of the
SG that FIND MSEC is applied to.
Note that we have two functions that we use for accessing the elements of the
path ρ, namely last and pop. last returns the last element of the path without
removing it, pop returns that element and removes it from ρ.
Many optimizations can be applied to the algorithm, for example stopping the
simulation not only in 1 and 0, but in any state where the bounds have converged.
One can also only deflate if the simulation was stopped due to SIM TOO LONG,
because otherwise the simulation was not stuck and quite possibly deflating is not
needed. Computing the MEC decomposition of GVis before finding the MSECs
is also speeding up the computation. Some other optimizations are only helpful
in certain cases, for example only adjusting if the simulation has been broken
several times or only adjusting the last EC on the path.
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Algorithm 8 Procedure for sampling and updating
1: procedure runSampleTrial(state s, upper bound function U, lower bound function
L, set of states Vis, precision ǫ)
2: \* Simulation phase * \
3: ρ ← s0
4: repeat
5: a ← sampled from bestU,L (last(ρ))
6: s ← GETSUCC(last(ρ), a)
7: ρ ← ρ a s
8: Vis← Vis ∪ s
9: if SIM TOO LONG(ρ) then
10: break
11: until s ∈ {1, 0}
12: \* Update phase * \
13: pop(ρ) \* Remove the last state * \
14: repeat
15: s ← pop(ρ)
16: a ← pop(ρ)
17: U(s, a)←
∑
s′∈S δ(s, a)(s
′) · U(s′)
18: L(s, a)←
∑
s′∈S δ(s, a)(s
′) · L(s′)
19: until ρ is empty
20: \* Deflating phase * \
21: compute GVis
22: for T ∈ FIND MSEC(L,GVis) do
23: DEFLATE(T,U)
B Experimental setup
B.1 Technical details
The experiments were conducted on a server with 256 GB RAM and 2 Intel(R)
Xeon(R) E5-2630 v4 2.20 GHz processors. However, computation was limited to
one core to avoid results being incomparable due to different times spent paral-
lelizing. All model checkers worked at a precision of ǫ = 10−6. Each experiment
had a timeout of 15 minutes. An X in a table indicates that the model checker
was unable to finish the computation in the time limit. We set the available Java
memory to 16GB to enable the solvers to construct the models, although still the
largest versions of csma and mer could not be loaded with the explicit engine.
Since the simulation based approaches are randomized, we took the median of
20 repetitions of the experiments. For SGs, we ran the experiments both with
the hybrid and the explicit engine of PRISM-games. However, since the mod-
els are small, i.e. less than 100,000 states, verification times for the hybrid and
explicit approach of PRISM never differ by more than a second, and hence we
only included the hybrid engine in Table 1.
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B.2 Models
Our experiments are based on the ones that were conducted in [Ujm15]. Most
models we use are also analyzed in that thesis, and we obtained them from the
website [Ujm], where the author of the thesis made them available for download.
We used the exact models from that website, but partly modified the properties
to be of a form that our implementation can handle. These modifications did
not change the semantics of the property, e.g. instead of formulating a property
that a probability is greater than a certain number(P>0.999) we compute the
maximal probability (Pmax=?), and then manually check whether it is greater
than the number. The only models not from [Ujm15] are csma and leader, which
are part of the examples included in PRISM 4.4.
We consider six MDP models, namely firewire, wlan, zeroconf, csma, leader
and mer. The first five are part of the PRISM benchmark suite [KNP12], mer
is from [FKP11]. The four SG models are mdsm, cdmsn, team-form and cloud,
and the first three are contained in the PRISM-games case studies [gam]. Cloud
is from [CKJ12]. Note that some of the SG models actually contain more than
two players. However, since there are at most two coalitions, they can be viewed
as an SG with only two players. We will now shortly describe all models, the
properties we check and the parameters we use for scaling.
firewire [KNS03]:
This case study models the protocol known as FireWire, which is a leader elec-
tion protocol of the IEEE 1394 High Performance Serial Bus. Several devices
connected to a bus can use the protocol to dynamically elect a leader. We com-
pute the probability Pmax=? [F leader elected], so the maximal probability
with which a leader gets elected before the deadline. By this one can check the
property that a leader gets elected with a certain, optimally high, probability.
To scale the model up, we raise the deadline.
wlan [KNS02]:
This model describes the two-way handshake mechanism of the IEEE 802.11
medium access control (WLAN protocol). Two stations try to communicate with
each other; however, if both of them send at once, a collision occurs. We are inter-
ested in computing the maximum probability that both stations transmit their
messages correctly, i.e. Pmax=? [F s1=12 & s2=12], where s1 and s2 describe
the state of the stations, and 12 is the final state where the transmission was
successful. To scale the model up, we increase the maximal backoff k and the
maximal number of collisions COL.
zeroconf [KNPS06]:
Zeroconf is a protocol for dynamically assigning an IP address to a device, pro-
vided that several other hosts have already blocked some IP addresses. The
device picks some IP randomly and then sends probes to check whether this
address is already in use. The parameters that we use to scale the model are N ,
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the number of other hosts already possessing an IP address and K, the number
of probes sent. The probability we are interested in is Pmin=? [F configured],
so the minimum probability with which the device obtains an IP address.
csma : [KNP12]
This case study concerns the IEEE 802.3 CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense, Multiple
Access with Collision Detection) protocol. N is the number of stations and K is
the maximum backoff. Pmin=? [ F min backoff after success<=K ] is the prob-
ability we are interested in, namely that a message of some station is eventually
delivered before k backoffs.
leader [KNP12]:
This case study is based on the asynchronous leader election protocol of [IR90].
This protocol solves the following problem. Given an asynchronous ring of N pro-
cessors design a protocol such that they will be able to elect a leader (a uniquely
designated processor) by sending messages around the ring. The probability we
are interested in is Pmax=? [ F ”elected” ], so that at some point a leader is
elected.
mer [FKP11]:
In the Mars Exploration Rover there is a resource arbiter that handles distribut-
ing resources to different users. There is a probability x that the communication
between the arbiter and the users fails. We change this probability to influence
the structure of the MDP. The probability we compute is Pmax=? [F err G],
which is the maximum probability that an error occurs.
mdsm [CFK+13b]:
This case study models multiple households which all consume different amounts
of energy over time. To minimize the peak energy consumption, they utilize the
distributed energy management “Microgrid Demand-Side Management” (mdsm).
The property we check is the maximal probability with which the first household
can deviate from the management algorithm, i.e. Pmax=? [F deviated], which
should be smaller than 0.01. We check the property once for player 1 and once
for player 2.
cdmsn [CFK+13b,SS12]:
This model describes a set of agents which have different sites available and
different preferences over these sites. The collective decision making algorithm
of this case study is utilized so that the agents agree on one decision. We analyze
the model to find the strategy for player 1 to make the agents agree on the first
site with a high probability, so <<p1>> Pmax=? [F all prefer 1].
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team-form [CKPS11]:
As in the previous case study, there are a set of agents in a distributed envi-
ronment. They need to form teams so they are able to perform a set of tasks
together. We want to compute a strategy so that the first task is completed
with the maximal possible probability, so we check the property <<p1,p2,p3>>
Pmax=? [F task1 completed]. We scale the model using the number of agents
N.
cloud [CKJ12]:
This model describes several servers and virtual machines forming a cloud sys-
tem. The controller of the system wants to deploy a web application on one of
the virtual machines, but it is possible that the servers fail due to hardware fail-
ures. We compute the strategy and the maximal probability for the controller to
successfully deploy his software, so <<controller>> Pmax=? [F deployed]. The
model can be scaled by increasing the number of virtual machines N.
B.3 Implementation optimizations
We tried several optimizations for both our algorithms, e.g. deflating an MSEC
repeatedly until no change greater than the precision occurs instead of changing
the upper bounds only once, only deflating the last EC that BRTDP explored
and prefering exiting actions in BRTDP. None of these showed a significant
improvement.
However, one optimization may greatly influence the verification time, namely
changing how often we execute the deflating step. For correctness, it is only re-
quired that deflation is called regularly; by that we mean infinitely often, if the
algorithm would not terminate at some point. In different words: For each it-
eration it holds, that in a future iteration deflate is executed, except for the
iterations between between the last deflating step and termination. For those
it only holds, that a deflating step would have occurred, had the algorithm not
terminated. We executed DEFLATE only every n steps for different n between 1
and 1000. Depending on the model, the choice of n may be irrelevant or influ-
ence performance even by an order of magnitude. Furthermore, both a large n
(100) or a small n (1) can be the best choice. It seems sensible to not execute
the expensive deflation after every Bellman update, when there are not many
MSECs and information just needs to be propagated. However, if many MSECs
are ordered sequentially, steps without a deflation are mostly useless. This is
why information on the model is needed to decide how often DEFLATE should
be called. Maybe it is possible to decide this during the value iteration, but we
have not yet found any heuristic for that.
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B.4 Experiments on MDPs
For the experiments on the MDPs we used four different programs, namely
PRISM 4.4.beta, Storm 1.1.0 [DJKV17b], the implementation that was used
in [BCC+14] (called BRTDP coll) and our own implementation, i.e. BVI and
BRTDP. We ran PRISM in three different version, namely once with the hybrid
engine (called PRISM h), once with the explicit engine (called PRISM e) and
once with interval iteration (called PRISM ii), so the approach using collapsing
to give guarantees, with the explicit engine. The first configuration shows what
PRISM can achieve, the second and third are fair competitors for BVI, since all
of them have to construct the whole model explicitly.
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the experiments, namely the complete
verification times for all models and the state space size with the number of
states that the simulation based approaches explored.
The results in Table 2 show that collapsing and deflating perform quite sim-
ilar, since PRISM ii and BVI as well as BRTDP coll and BRTDP produced
similar verification times.
On smaller models, e.g. wlan for the first four rows, csma the first four
rows and leader the first three rows, PRISM ii and BVI are not significantly
slower than PRISM h. For the other models, the gain of the hybrid engine makes
PRISM d and Storm a lot faster. Most probably when implementing BVI for
the hybrid engine the overhead for giving the guarantee will also be small. In
all models but zeroconf for K=10 and mer for x=0.0001, PRISM e and BVI
produce times in the same order of magnitude, so the overhead for computing
the guarantees is not too large.
The simulation based approaches BRTDP and BRTDP coll perform well
on firewire, wlan and zeroconf, even outperforming Storm in some cases. For
firewire they are two orders of magnitude faster. So in certain cases, simula-
tion based approaches can produce a huge speedup while still giving guarantees.
However for csma, leader and mer they are not well suited, as they need to ex-
plore thousands of states to achieve convergence. For the first two rows of mer
they are still faster, since the explored part of the state space is very small in
comparison to the whole model and not too large in general, but as the model
is scaled, the number of relevant states grows too large for the simulation based
approaches to work well.
The results in Table 3 show that BRTDP coll explores a larger portion of
the state space for almost all experiments. This is due to the different choice of
k, so the number of steps before an exploration is broken. The higher k that is
implemented in BRTDP coll allows for exploring longer, and hence more of the
state space is explored. This can be advantageous for the verification time, as
in mer with x=0.0001 or for csma with N=3 K=4, but can also prevent from
producing any result in time as in leader with N=6 or mer with x=0.1.
In general one can see, that the approach of deflating works well also on
MDPs and that giving guarantees is often possible without significant overhead.
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Table 2: CPU time for each experiment in seconds. Models and their scaling pa-
rameters are denoted on the left, solvers in the topmost column. We compared
Storm, PRISM in three different version, namely once with the hybrid engine
(called PRISM h), once with the explicit engine (PRISM e) and once with in-
terval iteration (PRISM ii), furthermore our approaches (BVI and BRTDP) and
the collapsing based approach from [BCC+14] (BRTDP coll)
Model Parameters Storm PRISM h PRISM e PRISM ii BVI BRTDP coll BRTDP
firewire
deadline=220 delay=36 162 259 459 449 468 2 2
deadline=240 delay=36 219 453 600 593 718 2 2
deadline=260 delay=36 252 882 745 X X 2 2
deadline=280 delay=36 316 751 X X X 2 2
wlan
k=2 COL=2 0 3 3 4 3 2 2
k=2 COL=6 1 4 5 7 6 2 2
k=4 COL=2 4 16 18 25 22 2 2
k=4 COL=6 7 21 34 35 35 2 2
k=6 COL=2 57 164 703 737 727 2 2
k=6 COL=6 58 179 700 740 754 2 2
zeroconf
K=2 N=20 1 6 5 5 16 3 2
K=2 N=500 0 7 5 6 21 3 2
K=2 N=1000 1 7 5 5 24 3 2
K=10 N=20 35 167 101 128 X 3 2
K=10 N=500 36 172 101 138 X 4 2
K=10 N=1000 35 180 100 145 X 5 2
csma
N=2 K=2 0 1 2 2 2 3 2
N=2 K=4 0 2 2 2 2 7 7
N=2 K=6 0 2 4 4 4 89 86
N=3 K=2 0 2 4 4 4 14 22
N=3 K=4 15 5 31 32 37 227 X
N=3 K=6 X 58 X X X X X
leader
N=3 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
N=4 0 2 2 2 2 3 4
N=5 0 3 3 3 3 24 13
N=6 4 10 9 10 9 X 46
mer
x=0.0001 n=1500 48 108 184 X X 17 41
x=0.0001 n=3000 101 220 X X X 16 40
x=0.1 n=1500 51 150 188 X X X 698
x=0.1 n=3000 102 291 X X X X 604
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Table 3: The number of states for each model and the number of states that the
simulation based approach had to explore. Models and their scaling parameters
are denoted on the left. (top is state space and simulation based approach)
Model Parameters #States BRTDP coll BRTDP
firewire
deadline=220 delay=36 10,490,495 792 797
deadline=240 delay=36 13,366,666 779 718
deadline=260 delay=36 15,255,584 791 432
deadline=280 delay=36 19,213,802 1,050 683
wlan
k=2 COL=2 28,598 584 113
k=2 COL=6 107,854 676 110
k=4 COL=2 345,118 767 112
k=4 COL=6 728,990 764 120
k=6 COL=2 5,007,666 858 125
k=6 COL=6 5,007,670 691 113
zeroconf
K=2 N=20 89,586 393 125
K=2 N=500 89,586 1,601 560
K=2 N=1000 89,586 1,625 937
K=10 N=20 3,001,911 1,161 645
K=10 N=500 3,001,911 3,836 643
K=10 N=1000 3,001,911 5,358 622
csma
N=2 K=2 1,038 964 966
N=2 K=4 7,958 7,691 7,811
N=2 K=6 66,718 64,341 32,929
N=3 K=2 36,850 22,883 26,632
N=3 K=4 1,460,287 266,724 X
N=3 K=6 84,856,004 X X
leader
N=3 364 335 306
N=4 3,172 2,789 2,565
N=5 27,299 21,550 8,420
N=6 237,656 128,593 20,551
mer
x=0.0001 n=1500 8,862,064 2,603 2,005
x=0.0001 n=3000 17,722,564 2,632 2,035
x=0.1 n=1500 8,862,064 X 7,461
x=0.1 n=3000 17,722,564 X 7,453
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B.5 Experiments on SGs
The results of the experiments on teamform, where pre-computation already
solved the problem for PRISM-games and BVI, are shown in Table 4. BRTDP
performs bad on this model because a large part of the state space is relevant
for convergence, namely over 60% with N=3 and at least 50% for N=4. Also the
number of relevant states is very large.
Table 4: Verification time for teamform in seconds. An X denotes that the com-
putation did not finish within the time limit.
Model Parameters PRISM BVI BRTDP
teamform
N=3 3 3 139
N=4 9 10 X
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C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Let T be an EC of an SG. Then for everym such that bestExitV (T ) ≤
m ≤ bestExit©
V
(T ), there is a solution to the Bellman equations, which on T is
constant and equal to m.
Proof. Let T be an EC and m a number in [0, 1] satisfying bestExitV (T ) ≤ m ≤
bestExit
©
V
(T ). Furthermore, let U be a function where for all s ∈ T : U(s) = m.
We now show that U is a fixpoint of the Bellman equations, i.e. for each
s ∈ T : U(s) = maxa∈Av(s) U(s, a) = m and for each s ∈ T© : U(s) =
mina∈Av(s)U(s, a) = m.
Claim 1: For every state s ∈ T there is an action a ∈ Av(s) such that U(s, a) =
m.
1. Let s ∈ T .
2. Since T is an EC, there exists an a ∈ Av(s) : (s, a) stays inT . Let a be such
a staying action.
3. From this we know Post(s, a) ⊆ T . Since by assumption for all s′ ∈ T :
U(s′) = m, it also holds that
U(s, a) =
∑
s′∈Post(s,a)
δ(s, a)(s′) · U(s′) =
∑
s′∈Post(s,a)
δ(s, a)(s′) ·m = m
It remains to show that a actually is the action that is used to compute the
upper bound. For that we make a case distinction on the player that s belongs
to.
1. s ∈ T:
Since a is an arbitrary staying action, it suffices to show that for all actions
a′ ∈ Av(s) : (s, a′) exits T =⇒ U(s, a) ≥ U(s, a′). This is done by the
following chain of equations:
U(s, a) = m (by Claim 1)
≥ bestExitU (T ) (by assumption)
≥ max
a′∈Av(s):(s,a′) exitsT
U(s, a′) (since s ∈ T)
≥ U(s, a′) (since (s, a′) exitsT )
2. s ∈ T©:
Since a is an arbitrary staying action, it suffices to show that for all actions
a′ ∈ Av(s) : (s, a′) exits T =⇒ U(s, a) ≤ U(s, a′). This is done by the
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following chain of equations:
U(s, a) = m (by Claim 1)
≤ bestExit©
U
(T ) (by assumption)
≤ min
a′∈Av(s):(s,a′) exitsT
U(s, a′) (since s ∈ T©)
≤ U(s, a′) (since (s, a′) exitsT )
⊓⊔
C.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 (BVI converges without BECs). If the SG G contains no
BECs, then
∀s ∈ S : G∗(s)− V(s) = 0,
i.e. value iteration from above converges to the value in the limit.
Proof. We denote the difference in a state by ∆(s) := G∗(s)− V(s).
1. Assume for contradiction there exists a state s ∈ S s.t. ∆(s) > 0.
2. Let X := {s | s ∈ S ∧ ∆(s) = max
s∈S
∆(s)} denote the set of all states with
maximal difference. By definition, we require L(1) = G∗(1) = 1 for every
1 ∈ F. Hence, ∆(1) = 0 and thus, F ∩ X = ∅. Analogously, it follows that
the sink state 0 /∈ X .
3. There exists a state sℓ ∈ X and an action aℓ ∈ Av(s) such that (sℓ, aℓ) exits
X and it holds:
– (Condition 1) G∗(sℓ) = G
∗(sℓ, aℓ) if s ∈ S
– (Condition 2) V(sℓ) = V(sℓ, aℓ) if s ∈ S©
For proving this statement we distinguish two cases:
(a) There exists no set of actions A′ such that X is an end component. We
distinguish two more cases.
i. There exists a partition X = X1 ∪˙ . . . ∪˙ Xn such that for every
1 ≤ i ≤ n there exists a set of action ai such that Xi is an end
component. We apply the proof of the second case (starting in Step
3b) to every end component.
ii. There exists no partition X = X1 ∪˙ . . . ∪˙ Xn such that for every
1 ≤ i ≤ n there exists a set of action ai such that Xi is an end
component. Hence, there exists a state s ∈ X , which is not part of
any end component in X . Thus, for all actions a ∈ Av(s), it holds
Post(s, a) 6⊆ X .
To find a suitable pair (sℓ, aℓ), we set sℓ = s and choose an action aℓ
such that
aℓ =
{
argmaxa∈Av(s
ℓ
) G
∗(sℓ, a) if sℓ ∈ X
argmina∈Av(s
ℓ
) V(s, a) if sℓ ∈ X©,
because all actions in s exit X .
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(b) There exists a set of actions A′ such that X is an end component.
i. X cannot be a BEC, since the game G does not have any BECs,
which do not contain the target state 1 or the sink 0. Hence, there
exists a pair (s, a) such that s ∈ X and a ∈ Av(s) s.t. (s, a) exits
X8. We additionally require
(sℓ, aℓ) = argmax
s
′∈X,as′∈Av(s
′):
(s′,a
s′
) exitsX
G∗(s′, as′).
ii. We still need to prove that
G∗(sℓ, aℓ) = G
∗(sℓ) = max
a
m
∈Av(s
ℓ
)
G∗(sℓ, am),
i.e. aℓ maximizes the upper bound of sℓ. Assume for contradiction
that there is an a′ ∈ Av(sℓ) s.t. G
∗(sℓ, a
′) > G∗(sℓ, aℓ) and (sℓ, a
′) stays
in X . In addition, let m be the maximal upper bound occurring in
X , i.e. m := max
s∈X
G∗(s). It holds m > G∗(sℓ, aℓ) because G
∗(sℓ) >
G∗(sℓ, aℓ) and thus, G
∗(sℓ, aℓ) cannot be the maximal upper bound.
Let s ∈ X be a state such that G∗(s) = m.
– If s ∈ X©, the upper bound G∗(s) is defined as the minimal
upper bound G∗(s, a) for any action a ∈ Av(s). Thus, if s ∈ X©,
for all actions a ∈ Av(s), it holds G∗(s, a) ≥ m, since G∗(s) = m.
– If s ∈ X, there exists an action a ∈ Av(s) s.t. G
∗(s, a) = m and
(s, a) stays in X . It holds G∗(s) = m. In addition, we know that
m > G∗(s′, a′) for any state s′ ∈ X and any action a
′ ∈ Av(s′)
such that (s′, a′) exits X because G∗(sℓ, aℓ) is the largest up-
per bound of a leaving action and still smaller than m, which
is the value of the state. Hence, G∗(s) = G∗(s, a) for some ac-
tion a ∈ Av(s), which stays in X .
Let Y := {s | s ∈ X ∧ G∗(s) = m} be the set of states, which have
a maximal upper bound in X . The previous case distinction shows
that for every state s ∈ Y , there exists an action a ∈ Av(s) such that
the pair (s, a) stays in X . We now show that there there also exists
an action a staying in Y .
– To arrive at a contradiction, assume there exists no such action,
i.e. for all actions a ∈ Av(S ), it holds (s, a) exits Y .
– Hence, Post(s, a) 6⊆ Y , i.e. there exists a state s′ ∈ Post(s, a) 6∈ Y .
It holds G∗(s′) < m by definition of Y .
– Thus,
G∗(s, a) =
∑
s∗∈Post(s,a)
δ(s, a)(s∗) · G∗(s∗)
=
( ∑
s∗∈Post(s,a)\{s′}
δ(s, a)(s∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
·G∗(s∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤G∗(s)
)
+ δ(s, a)(s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
·G∗(s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<G∗(s)
< G∗(s),
8 As X is not a BEC, there must exist both a maximizer and a minimizer state with
leaving actions. We choose to work with a maximizing state here.
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which is a contradiction.
Hence, there exists some set Z ⊆ Y s.t. Z is an end component.
By definition of Y and Z ⊆ Y , every state s ∈ Z has upper bound m,
i.e. G∗(s) = m. By definition of X and Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X , every state s ∈ Z
has maximal difference. The maximal difference d is defined as d :=
∆(s) = maxs′∈S ∆(s
′). As elements of the set Z both have a maximal
upper bound and the maximal difference, it holds V(s) = m− d for
every s ∈ Z (the value is the the upper bound minus the difference
between the upper bound and the value).
– For all states s ∈ Z and all actions a ∈ Av(s), it holds
V(s, a) ≤ m− d = V(s)
by definition of the value and the previous step. Hence,
max
s∈Z,a∈Av(t):
(s,a) exitsZ
V(s, a) ≤ m− d.
– For every state s ∈ Z© and every action a ∈ Av(s) s.t. (s, a)
exits Z, it holds (s, a) exits X . (For every (s, a) ∈ X©, it holds
G∗(s, a) ≥ m. Either all states s′ ∈ Post(s, a) are in Z (and thus,
have value m), which is a contradiction to (s, a) is leaving Z, or
there must exist some s′ ∈ Post(s, a), which is not in Z. Assume,
it is in X . Then, its value must be smaller than m. Hence, there
must be state s′′, which cannot be in X , s.t. G∗(s′′) > G∗(s) = m.
Hence, if an state-action-pair is leaving Z, it is also leaving X).
For every state s ∈ Z© and every action a ∈ Av(s) s.t. (s, a) exits
Z, it holds V(s, a) ≥ m− d. Additionally, (s, a) exits X , and hence,
G∗(s, a)− V(s, a) < d.
Since d > G∗(s, a)− V(s, a) ≥ m− V(s, a), it holds that
V(s, a) > m− d.
This implies that for every state s ∈ Z©, and every action a ∈ Av(s)
s.t. (s, a) exits Z, it holds
V(s, a) > max
s
∗∈Z,a
∗∈Av(t):
(s∗,a∗) exitsZ
V(s∗, a∗).
Thus, every exiting action of the minimizing player has a higher
value than the best exiting action of the maximizing player, which
means that the end component is bloated. Hence, Z is a BEC, which
is a contradiction to the assumption that the game does not contain
any bloated end component. Thus, the assumption was wrong, and
it holds that aℓ maximizes the upper bound of sℓ.
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4. We now use Step 3 to arrive at a contradiction to the assumption in Step 1
as follows: If sℓ ∈ X, it holds G
∗(sℓ) = G
∗(sℓ, aℓ) by Step 3 and V(sℓ) ≥
V(sℓ, aℓ) by Equation 1 (sℓ is a maximizing state). If sℓ ∈ X©, it holds
V(sℓ) = V(sℓ, aℓ) by Step 3 and G
∗(sℓ) ≤ G
∗(sℓ, aℓ) (sℓ is a minimizing
state). Hence, we know
∆(sℓ) = G
∗(sℓ)− V(sℓ) (by definition of ∆)
≤ G∗(sℓ, aℓ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥G∗(s
ℓ
)
−V(sℓ, aℓ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤V(s
ℓ
)
(by Step 4)
= ∆(sℓ, aℓ) (by definition of ∆)
< ∆(sℓ) (aℓ exits X)
We arrive at a contradiction. Thus, our assumption was wrong and it holds
for all states s ∈ S : ∆(s) = 0. ⊓⊔
C.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 (Correctness of Algorithm 2). T ∈ FIND MSEC(V) if and only
if T is an MSEC.
Proof. We prove the equivalence by showing each direction separately.
– T ∈ FIND MSEC(V) =⇒ T is an MSEC
1. Let T ∈ FIND MSEC(V). So T is a MEC of the game where the mapping
of available actions X := {(s, {a ∈ Av(s) | V(s, a) > V(s)}) | s ∈ S©}
has been removed.
2. Hence for all s ∈ T©, a ∈ Av
′(s) : V(s, a) = V(s).
3. We now show that for all s ∈ T : V(s) = bestExitV (T ).
• If there is no exit for player , then bestExitV (T ) = 0, and all states
in T have the value 0, since player © can force the game to stay
inside the EC forever.
• If there is an exiting state e for player , then also from each state
in T there is a path using only states in T to e. For each state s ∈ T
we can compute V(s) by recursively applying the Bellman equations.
In each application, we choose an action that leads us closer to e,
i.e. for t being the next state on the path to e, choose a such that
V(s, a) = δ(s, a, t) · V(t) +
∑
s′∈Post(s,a)\{t} δ(s, a, s
′) · V(s′). Since for
each state in T we have a path to e, we can replace each V(s′) in this
way. By repeating this and thereby multiplying all the probabilities
δ(s, a, t), the factor in front of the terms that do not contain V(e)
approach 0, and thus we get V(s, a) = V(e) for an arbitrary s ∈ T
and a staying action a. Since for the minimizer all actions have the
same value by Step 2, all minimizer states have as value V(e). The
maximizer can certainly achieve V(e), since he picks the action with
the maximal value. He can not achieve more than V(e), because this
is defined to be the best exit from the EC, and thus the best value
that can be achieved from any state in the EC.
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4. Since T is a MEC of the game with some available actions removed, it
certainly is an EC in the original game. Thus, from this and the previous
step, we know that T is a SEC.
5. T is an MSEC, because if there was some T ′ ! T , such that T ′ is a SEC,
then there exists some state s ∈ T ′ \ T with all staying actions of this
state having the value bestExitV (T ). If it is a minimizer state, it cannot
have a lower exit available, because otherwise T ′ would not be a SEC.
Thus no staying action of s is removed by Line 3, and it should also be
part of the MEC in the modified game. This contradicts the assumption
that s /∈ T , and thus T is an MSEC.
– T is an MSEC =⇒ T ∈ FIND MSEC(V)
1. Let T be an MSEC. We need to show that T is a MEC of the game where
the set of actions X := {(s, {a ∈ Av(s) | V(s, a) > V(s)}) | s ∈ S©} has
been removed.
2. Since T was an inclusion maximal component in the original game and
by removing actions we cannot make an end component larger, if T is
an EC in the modified game, it is a MEC.
3. So we now show that T is a MEC in the modified game:
Since T is a MEC in the original game, there exists a B such that for
each s ∈ T, a ∈ B ∪ Av(s) we do not have (s, a) exitsT . Hence for all
s ∈ T, a ∈ B ∪ Av(s) it holds that
V(s, a) =
∑
s′∈S
δ(s, a, s′) · V(s′) (by Equation 2)
=
∑
s′∈S
δ(s, a, s′) · bestExitV (T ) (since s
′ ∈ T and T is simple)
= bestExitV (T )
So every action that stays in T (i.e. does not exit T ), in particular every
action in B, is not removed from the game, because for all s ∈ T, a ∈
Av(s),¬(s, a) exits T : V(s) = bestExitV (T ) = V(s, a). The first equality
comes from T being an MSEC, the second is what we have just shown.
Since no action in B is removed from the game, T is still a MEC after
the removal, and hence T ∈ FIND MSEC(V) .
⊓⊔
C.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3 (DEFLATE is sound). For any f : S → [0, 1] such that f ≥ V and
any EC T , DEFLATE(T, f) ≥ V.
Proof. Let T be an EC and f : S → [0, 1] such that f ≥ V.
1. We reformulate the goal to saying that for all state s ∈ T it holds that
min(f(s), bestExitf (T )) ≥ V(s).
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This is equivalent to our goal, because the change in Line 3 is the only
change the Algorithm 3 applies and because the comparison of the functions
DEFLATE(T, f) and V is pointwise.
2. If in Line 3 of DEFLATE min(f(s), bestExitf (T )) gets evaluated to f(s) or if
f(s) = bestExitf (T ), by assumption of f ≥ V the goal trivially holds.
3. If f(s) > bestExitf (T ), the following chain of equations proves our goal:
DEFLATE(T, f)(s) = bestExitf (T )
≥ bestExitV (T ) (Since f ≥ V)
≥ V(s)
(Since no state can achieve a greater value than the best exit)
⊓⊔
C.5 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 (Soundness and completeness). Algorithm 1 (calling Algorithm 4)
produces monotonic sequences L under- and U over-approximating V, and ter-
minates.
Proof. We denote by Li and Ui the lower/upper bound function after the i-th
call of UPDATE.
1. The fact that Li and Ui are monotonic under- respectively over-approximations
of V comes from the fact that they are updated via Bellman updates, which
preserve monotonicity and the under-/over-approximating property (this can
be shown by a simple induction), and from Lemma 3.
2. We still need to prove that the algorithm terminates, i.e. that for all ǫ > 0
there exists an n such that Un(s0)− Ln(s0) < ǫ .
3. Since limn→∞ Ln = V (from e.g. [CH08]), it suffices to show that limn→∞ Un−
V = 0. In the following, let ∆(s) := limn→∞ Un − V.
4. Assume for contradiction that there exist states with ∆(s) > 0.
5. Let X := {s | s ∈ S ∧∆(s) = max
s∈S
∆(s)} be the set of those states that have
the maximal difference.
6. Since ∆ > 0 is required by Step 4, {1, 0} ∩X = ∅.
7. Hence X ⊂ S and there have to be states outside of X .
8. If X is not a SEC, the proof of Theorem 1 proves our goal. So we continue
with the assumption that X is a SEC.X also is an MSEC, because the upper
bound is propagated to all states in X , as all of them can achieve the bound
of the best exit.
9. At some point Li converges close enough to V to fix all decisions of the
Minimizer correctly, and then X ∈ FIND MSEC(Li).
– This need not happen surely, but we can have the case where two actions
have equal value, but different L forever. But that case is no problem,
since then the part that seems to have the smaller value is deflated, and
the other sets its upper bounds accordingly.
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10. If there was no leaving state-action pair for player , U(s) = 0 for all states
in X by Line 3 of DEFLATE, and hence the difference would be 0. Thus we
continue with the assumption that there exists a leaving state-action pair
for player .
11. Without loss of generality, let sℓ ∈ X, aℓ ∈ Av(sℓ) be a leaving state-action
pair with
lim
n→∞
Un(sℓ, aℓ) = bestExit

U (X).
12. If U(sℓ, aℓ) = U(sℓ), we are done by the same chain of equations as in Step
4 of the proof of Theorem 1.
13. If U(sℓ, aℓ) 6= U(sℓ), it holds that U(sℓ, aℓ) < U(sℓ) by Equation 4 and since
sℓ ∈ X.
14. Then, since U(sℓ, aℓ) is the maximal leaving upper bound, all upper bounds
in X get decreased to it by 3 of DEFLATE. This is a contradiction, because
∆ is defined as the limit of the difference. Thus, our assumption was wrong
and it holds for all states s ∈ S : ∆(s) = 0.
Note that all our algorithms take finite time, as they are monotonic on a finite
domain, i.e. we always execute something for each member of a finite set. ⊓⊔
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